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PIERRE AUBENQUE, LE PROBLÈME DE L’ÊTRE CHEZ ARISTOTE: An outline with commentary

What follows is my outline of, with occasional comments (in red) on, Pierre Aubenque's book Le Problème de l'être chez Aristote, 5th ed. (Paris: PUF, 2009). Pierre Aubenque is one of the most important french Aristotelian scholars of the 20th century. His theory is deeply indebted both to Wernaer Jaeger and Martin Heidegger. Perhaps this will be helpful to some. The book is divided into two main parts, and Introduction and a Conclusion.

Introduction
1.      First Philosophy = the foundational part of philosophy (p. 38-39)
a.       It is a part of the science of being qua being but is not equivalent to the science of being qua being. (p. 36)
b.      First philosophy = theology (p. 36-37)
c.       First philosophy is not Metaphysics (p. 68)
2.      The science of being qua being = that part of Metaphysics commonly known as ontology (p. 68)
3.      So, for Aubenque, Metaphysics is an umbrella term under which is found two distinct (yet connected) sciences: First philosophy (theology) and the science of being qua being (ontology).

First Part
1.      Philosophy is a dialogue that extends through time and the history of humanity (p. 87-89, 92-93)
a.       Two types of dialogue: (1) a dialogue between the philosopher and beings, (2) a dialogue between philosophers
2.      Being and Language
a.       The sign = a relationship between things (p. 109)
                                                              i.      Simple signification (p. 109-110)
                                                            ii.      Judgment (p. 111-113)
b.      2 elements of Aristotle’s theory of language (p. 118)
c.       Language is incapable of reaching (touching, grasping, comprehending) the objects that it signifies (p. 114-115)
d.      The equivocality (homonymy) of words
                                                              i.      2 types (p. 119)
1.      Natural and Accidental (p. 120)
                                                            ii.      This is the cause of the sophisms (the fallacy of equivocation) – (p. 120-123)
1.      In order to eliminate equivocations it is necessary to distinguish between the multiple meanings – provide a proper word for each individual meaning that is applied to the original word (p. 123)
a.       Importance of the principle of contradiction (p. 124-127)
                                                                                                                                      i.      This principle is based on being (p. 128fn2)
                                                          iii.      The essence (or being) of X is the foundation for all dialogue, language and meaning (p. 127-129, 131-132, 134)
a.       Therefore, univocal meaning must be the rule, and equivocal speech the exception. (p. 131)
2.      For Aristotle, the theory of language presupposes a certain ontology (p. 133)
a.       On the other hand, Aubenque claims, ontology presupposes, just as much, language (p.l33)
                                                                                                                                      i.      Just what he means by this is unclear from the text, and seems to be a view that is clearly dependent on Martin Heidegger. I think that an important distinction, that Pierre does not make, needs to be made here, namely: the possibility of language and dialogue presupposes a certain ontology (if this ontology is not true, then no language, dialogue or meaning is possible); on the other hand, explaining, debating and dialogue concerning ontology presupposes language. In other words, unless a certain ontological framework is the case, no language, dialogue or meaning is possible; and, inversely, it impossible to express this ontology if language is not possible.
b.      If there are no essences, then everything is nothing but essence. This is because if everything is accident, then everything is one. If all is one, then all is essence. (p. 138)
                                                                                                                                      i.      Accident = non-being (p. 138-139)
c.       Being = essence (p. 140-142)
                                                                                                                                      i.      But, accident “is” in a sense
                                                                                                                                    ii.      Therefore, there are multiple meanings (ways of saying) being (p. 142-144)
1.      How can being be both one and many? (p. 142-145)
a.       The platonic solution (p. 146-148)
                                                                                                                                                                                                              i.      This solution is insufficient (p. 148-159)
                                                                                                                                                                                                            ii.      There are many meanings of “non-being” (p. 153-156)
                                                                                                                                                                                                          iii.      “il n’y a…de négation que dans la proposition.” (p. 156)
                                                                                                                                                                                                          iv.      Therefore, it is language that renders discussion concerning non-being possible, and not the inverse (p. 156) This is a great point!!!!

3.      The Aristotelian Solution to the problem of the one and the Many—the meaning of Being
a.       The science of being is, for Aristotle, the solution to the Sophistical Aporias (p. 158-159)
b.      Aristotle’s solution: Distinguish the many meanings of Being (p. 160-163)
                                                              i.      Being: of itself (essential), accidental, in act, in potency (p. 163)
                                                            ii.      The Categories (p. 164)
                                                          iii.      Being as true/false (p. 165-171)
1.      2 meanings
c.       The meaning of Being is found in the categories (p. 170-172)
                                                              i.      Which brings up the problem of the equivocality of being (p. 172-181)
1.      Many “things that are signified” & “meanings/significations” (p. 173-174)
2.      2 possible ways of understanding the homonymy of being (p. 179)
a.       Aristotle does not decide between the two ways (p. 180-181)
                                                            ii.      2 ways of understanding the categories (p. 182-184)
1.      Way of being of beings “l’étant”
2.      Or a way of speaking (predicating)
3.      We must choose the first option (p. 184)
a.       Therefore, the question of being becomes “What is the beings “l’étant”? (p. 184)
                                                          iii.      Therefore, “What is the beings?” – in other words – “what are the things that are?”
1.      If the categories are giving a list of beings (ways of being), then we fall prey to the problem of Meno and Euthyphro (p. 185-186)
2.      There is not, therefore, one single response to the question “What is the beings?”(p. 186)
a.       There is not, therefore, a response to the question of being (p. 186-188)
                                                          iv.      However, the “being” of beings remains unanalyzed, and appears to have, as well, a number of different meanings (p. 188-189)
1.      It is, therefore, necessary to reduce them. Such an endeavour will be eternally unfinished (p. 189-190)
a.       This is why the question of being is “always asked”.
2.      Therefore, “the being” is “above the categories” (p. 190)
a.       Of the two types of homonymy (accidental and natural) being is not an accidental homonymy (p. 190-192)
                                                                                                                                      i.      Being is a πρὸς ἓν λεγόμενον (p. 191)
1.      There are a multitude of meanings of Being that are all related to one single nature (or foundation) – (p. 191-192) – this sounds like the analogy of being.
2.      This one nature/foundation is οὐσία (p. 192-193)
3.      But οὐσία, as foundation, is one of the categories that it founds and, at the same time, that which founds the categories.
4.      Therefore, οὐσία is, at the same time, foundation and founded (p. 193, 195)
                                                                                                                                    ii.      Therefore, the question of being is nothing other but a different form of the problem of homonymy (p. 194)
1.      Essence - οὐσία- means being, but not perfectly (p. 196-197)
2.      Therefore, the problem of being persists, and is, indeed, unsolvable (p. 198)
d.      Replies to possible objections to Aubenque’s interpretation of Aristotle
                                                              i.      Against the thomistic analogy of Being (p. 199)
                                                            ii.      Against Alexander’s univocity of Being (p. 199-202)
                                                          iii.      Analogy of Proportionality (p. 202-206)
1.      Aubenque claims that there is no analogy of Being in Aristotle
e.       It seems like Aubenque is simply play around with semantics to say that the word that Aristotle uses to talk about “Analogy” is never applied to “Being”, and, therefore, that there is no such thing as an “analogy of being” in Aristotle. It seems like somebody could respond to Aubenque, “but if what I mean by ‘analogy’ is what Aristotle means by ‘Being πρὸς ἓν λεγόμενον’, then, regardless of what Aristotle calls it, ‘Analogy’, according to my definition of ‘analogy’, is found in Aristotle.
                                                              i.      Cf. Ralph McInerny, Aquinas & Analogy (Washington, D. C.: CUA Press, 1996), 46.
4.      Can there be a science of Being qua being (ontology)? (p. 206-250)
a.       What makes a discussion scientific
                                                              i.      That it is about some genus (p. 208-210)
1.      In other words, it is about something that is determinate and universal
                                                            ii.      Aristotle is seeking, according to Aubenque, a science of the totality of all beings (of universality of being), but it is impossible (p. 210-214)
1.      It seems, against Aubenque’s portrayal of the discussion, that Aristotle speaks of the universal (contrasted with the particular) not the totality of all things (p. 214). In other words, Aristotle is saying that science is of the universal.
                                                          iii.      So, what Aristotle does, according to Aubenque, is to seek a science of the principles of all things (p. 214-215)
1.      But this science is also impossible (p. 216-219)
a.       The aporia of the science of being as being (p. 222)
                                                                                                                                      i.      First proposition (p. 222) - there is a science of being qua being
                                                                                                                                    ii.      Second proposition (p. 222-226) -   all science is of a determinate genus
                                                                                                                                  iii.      Third proposition (p. 226-231) - Being is not a genus.
1.      2 interpretations to avoid
a.       The positive – Aquinas (p. 231-324)
b.      The Negative – Hégel (p. 234-235)
2.      The proper interpretation – Aubenque (p. 235-236)
3.      Another argument demonstrating that being is not a genus (p. 236-239)
a.       And, therefore, that there can be no science of being (p. 239)
                                                          iv.      However, contrary to this conclusion: Aristotle says that there is a science of being (p. 239-250)
1.      Why? – This is an ideal but unattainable science (p. 240-244)
a.       The science of being qua being, the science of the principles of essence are, in reality, knowledge of the categories (p. 246-249)
                                                            v.      Conclusion: There can be no science of being, but, is it possible for there to be a dialectic of being? (p. 250)
5.      Is Aristotle’s Ontology a Dialectic?
a.       A short history of Dialectic (p. 251-64)
                                                              i.      Plato and dialectic (p. 252-53)
                                                            ii.      Aristotle and dialectic (p. 253-64)
1.      Aristotle’s understanding of dialectic (p. 255-57)
a.       Universality
b.      The probability of the starting point
2.      Dialectic is opposed to science (p. 257)
3.      Description of dialectician (p. 259-261)
a.       Rhetorician and the sophist
                                                                                                                                      i.      A traditional critique of the sophist (p. 261-262)
b.      The art of Rhetoric (p. 262-264)
b.      The endeavor to find a first science that will make man happy (p. 264-267)
                                                              i.      The options (p. 268)
1.      Three types of men (p. 268-269)
a.       The scholar
b.      The philosopher
c.       The free and cultured man
                                                            ii.      The science that is being pursued creates a dilemma (p. 271-279)
1.      Is it a science of everything or a science of one unique and privileged thing? (p. 271-272)
a.       Response: both (p. 272)
                                                                                                                                      i.      2 interpretations of this response (p. 272-279)
1.      First because universal (p. 272-277)
2.      Universal because first (p. 277-279)
c.       The Metaphysics of Aristotle (p. 279-281)
                                                              i.      The duality of his inspiration (p. 279)
1.      Science of being qua being – ontological (p. 280)
2.      Science of the first principle – theological (p. 280)
3.      This duality is the source of the classical division (modern) of the Metaphysics (p. 279)
a.       I think that Aubenque is being influenced not by an Aristotelian understanding of metaphysics, but by modern interpretations of Aristotle on this question. This is because the modern distinctions in Aristotelian Metaphysics include, uncritically, that which Aristotle considered as philosophy of nature (cosmologie) which is not, for Aristotle, metaphysics (cf. Maritain, Philosophy of Nature); and, modern interpretations of Aristotle also make Aristotle’s science of the first principle into a positive theology, when, for Aristotle, it was, most certainly, a negative theology, and, just as important, knowledge of the first principle was not the proper object of Metaphysics – it is known as the cause of the proper object of Metaphysics.
4.      This duality in metaphysics finds, suggests Aubenque, its inspiration in the quest to find a science that is both universal and primary (p. 280)
a.       This is what creates, for Aristotle, the parental relationship between dialectics and ontology (p. 281)
                                                                                                                                      i.      I get the impression that Aubenque absolutely ignores the fact that Aristotle considers, in his metaphysics, the principle of being (theology) not as the proper object of the metaphysics, but as the principle (or cause) of the proper object of metaphysics (being as being).
1.      Therefore, another science would be necessary in order to know the first principle in its essence.
2.      It seems evident to me, in light of even Aubenque’s observations, that we cannot talk about the unity of the sciences in Aristotle, but, rather, of the division and distinction of the sciences based upon their proper objects.
d.      There is an opposition between the scientist (science) and the man of culture (dialectic) – (p. 282-302)
                                                              i.      The cultured man is the proper critique of the sciences (p. 283-285)
1.      The characteristics of culture (p. 285)
a.       Culture = dialectic (p. 286)
                                                                                                                                      i.      2 functions of dialectic (p. 286)
1.      Universality
2.      Questioning – the critical function
                                                            ii.      Comparison between dialectic and science (p. 287-302)
1.      Universality vs. specificity (p. 287-288)
2.      Positive vs. negative knowledge (p. 287-290)
3.      Truth claims vs. problems (p. 290-292)
                                                          iii.      Aristotle’s definition of dialectic (p. 293)
1.      “essence” and the syllogism vs. “essence” and dialectic (p. 294)
2.      2 types of dialectic (p. 294-295)
a.       Provisional and pre-scientific
b.      Dialogue
e.       Dialectic and the science of Being qua Being (p. 295-302)
                                                              i.      The traditional view sees opposition (p. 295-298)
                                                            ii.      There is also, however, a familial link (p. 299-300)
1.      How the science of being presents itself to us (p. 300)
a.       Absence of scientific syllogisms in the metaphysics, but, exclusive presence of dialectical method (p. 300-302)
                                                          iii.      Aristotle was seeking a “science” of being, not a “dialectic” of being (p. 302)
1.      Why, then, Aubenque asks, did he find nothing but a dialectic of being? Why did Aristotle fail in his search? (p. 302)

  
Second Part
1.      Introduction (p. 305-322)
a.       Summary of the questions asked in the first part (p. 305)
b.      The problem of unity and separation (p. 306-310)
                                                              i.      This problem gave birth to the search for a universal and primary science (p. 308-309)
                                                            ii.      This problem provides us with the question (and subject) of the second part of Aubenque’s book. (p. 310)
c.       Aristotle’s dilemma concerning the nature of philosophy (p. 310-311)
                                                              i.      Is Philosophy the united totality of all knowledge or a part of the united totality of all knowledge?
                                                            ii.      First question for Aristotle: Do separate and incorruptible beings exist? (p. 311)
1.      If yes, then there is an important separation between corruptible being and incorruptible being (p. 311)
a.       Plato’s solution and Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s solution (p. 311-314)
b.      Aristotle’s solution (p. 314-322)
                                                                                                                                      i.      There is no science which speaks, at the same time, of corruptible and incorruptible being (p. 317)
1.      There is no “being that is common” to the corruptible and incorruptible (p. 317)
2.      But, the principle of X must be of the same genus of X (p. 318)
3.      Therefore there is no “creator” God (p. 319-321)
                                                                                                                                    ii.      2 consequences for Aristotle’s Theology (p. 322-335)
1.      Theology is the only science (p. 322-329)
2.      Theology is useless (p. 330-335)
a.       There is no relation between God and corruptible things (p. 331)
b.      Aubenque rejects the possibility of a theory of Analogy, therefore, this point is indeed a difficulty, according to Aubenque, for Aristotle.
                                                                                                                                  iii.      There are, therefore, 2 concepts of philosophy in Aristotle (p. 334)
2.      Defense of Aubenque’s interpretation of Aristotle’s Theology (p. 335-368)
a.       Refutation of the Astral theology Interpretation (p. 335-355)
                                                                                                                                      i.      Astral Theology in Aristotle (p. 337-339)
                                                                                                                                    ii.      The place of Astral Theology in the philosophy of Aristotle (p. 339-355)
                                                                                                                                  iii.      One source of confusion: Aristotle’s use of the word “cosmos” (p. 343-348)
                                                                                                                                  iv.      The difficulties that man has when attempting to speak of God (also, a form of the triplex via) – (p. 353-354)
b.      Refutation of the first motor interpretation (p. 355-368)
                                                                                                                                      i.      How Aristotle arrives at the theory of a first motor (p. 355-356)
                                                                                                                                    ii.      The threat to the transcendence of the first motor (p. 356-360)
1.      How Aristotle responds to this threat (p. 360-365)
a.       Negative predication (p. 360-364)
b.      The categories do not apply to God (p. 363)
                                                                                                                                  iii.      How God moves the world (p. 365-368)
1.      As final cause
                                                                                                                                  iv.      The God of Aristotle vs. the God of Christianity (p. 367)
2.      The relation between Ontology and Theology in Aristotle (p. 368-411)
a.       Does Aristotle end up mixing them together? (p. 368)
                                                              i.      Aubenque thinks that there does not appear to be an difficulty with the definitions of ontology and theology, so long as we keep the two sciences separate (as Aristotle seems to want to do) – (p. 367-371)
                                                            ii.      Aubenque thinks that the confusion and mix up of these two sciences is due to the fact that Aristotle speaks of being qua being through negative predication, which resembles the way he talks about God (p. 371)
1.      I think that the confusion of the 2 sciences is a phenomena of modern philosophy.
2.      This seems to be due to the fact that modern philosophers have not made a distinction between the proper object of metaphysics (that being which is common to sensible being – ens commun) and the principle of the proper object of metaphysics (that which is the cause of the being of sensible beings). – cf. John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, p. 20-21.
b.      Ontology is born from a reflection on language (p. 372) – see above: Aubenque’s comment on ontology being dependant on language. I disagree heartily with Aubenque on this point. Our language that is used in ontological discourse is based upon being. Ontology, as discourse on being, is based on considering the distinctions that are within the things that are.
c.       Theology is a negative discourse concerning God (p. 372)
d.      Aristotle does not, according to Aubenque, want to accept the necessary consequence that theology cannot be the first of all the sciences, in light of the fact that it is nothing other than the first of the sciences that are concerned with particular beings, and, therefore, that it is submitted to ontology. (p. 372)
                                                              i.      This is not the impression that we get when we read Aristotle. Rather, we get the impression that Aristotle’s negative theology is not, properly speaking, a science. This is due to the fact that it is nothing other than observations concerning the cause (principle) of the “being” which is the proper object of ontology. If this is the case, then ontology is necessarily submitted to theology, though true theology is not possible for man.
                                                            ii.      Cf. p. 376 where Aubenque says that for Aristotle ontology could leave behind all discourse on God, because there is nothing that can be positively asserted about God (p. 376)
1.      Discourse concerning God tells us nothing about being (p. 379-80)
2.      Therefore the project of unifying the sciences fails (p. 380)
e.       We see, according to Aubenque, 2 conceptions of theology in Aristotle (p. 381)
                                                              i.      Science of the divine genus
                                                            ii.      Science of the principle
1.      Joseph Owens and Philip Merlan propose that for Aristotle the world is derived, in some way, from the first principle as first mover (p. 383)
a.       Problems with this thesis (p. 383-384)
2.      What Aristotle means by the principle of movement for the world (p. 384-390)
a.       God as final cause
b.      The relationship between the world and God (p. 390)
                                                                                                                                      i.      Ascending, not descending.
f.       The theological and ontological perspectives, though technically distinct in Aristotle, interfere frequently with each other (p. 390)
                                                              i.      2 examples
1.      Book Γ (p. 391-395)
2.      Book Λ (p. 396-401)
                                                            ii.      The theological perspective seems to frequently invade the ontological perspective (p. 401)
                                                          iii.      There is, however, something which allows us to reintroduce the distinction (p. 401)
1.      “as if” – I find this translation highly debatable.
a.       “human discourse must proceed as if…” (p. 401)
g.      How God is the final cause of the movement in the world (p. 402)
                                                              i.      As something to be imitated (p. 402)
1.      The question/problem of being qua being does not treat of God (p. 403)
2.      There is a major distinction between God and sensible beings (p. 404)
3.      Sensible beings imitate the unity of the divine οὐσία (p. 405)
a.       Aubenque examines the meaning of οὐσία (p. 405-406)
                                                                                                                                      i.      Divine οὐσία “is” (p. 406-408)
                                                                                                                                    ii.      Sensible οὐσία is more than οὐσία (p. 408)
h.      Aubenque’s proposed solution to the question of the chapter (p. 409-411)
                                                              i.      God is the only unity (p. 409)
                                                            ii.      All other things imitate the divine unity (p. 409)
                                                          iii.      Separation (p. 410)
i.        The relation between theology and ontology in Aristotle (p. 410-411)
                                                              i.      Theology = ontology of a world without movement (p. 411)
                                                            ii.      Ontology = the only theology that is possible in a world that is in constant movement (p. 411)
3.      The relationship between Aristotelian Physics and Ontology (p. 412-484)
a.       Analysis of a Plotinian critique of Aristotle (p. 412-413)
b.      Augustine’s modification of Plotinus’s critique (p. 413-414)
                                                              i.      In one manner of speaking, Aristotle’s God is not, because the categories cannot be applied to him. (p. 414)
1.      God is essence (p. 414)
a.       By which we mean “presence”
2.      “The God of Aristotle is not over and above being”, on the contrary, the sensible world is less than being (p. 415)
a.       Aristotle’s problem, therefore, is “why is the sensible world less than being?” (p. 415) – why this separation?
c.       The purpose of this chapter (and Aubenque’s thesis): that it is necessary to turn the traditional interpretation of Aristotle on its head (by traditional, Aubenque means the interpretation given by Suarez, Leibniz, Wolff, etc.) – (p. 416-418)
d.      The particularity of the being qua being of the sensible world (p. 418-419)
                                                              i.      Perpetual Movement (p. 419)
1.      Aubenque’s analysis of Aristotle’s doctrine of movement (p. 419-422)
2.      Conclusion: Aristotle’s Physics is an ontology (p. 422)
a.       it seems to me that Aubenque forgets an important distinction among Aristotle’s sciences – the philosophy of nature. This negligence creates confusion in Aubenque’s interpretation – Cf. Jacques Maritain, Philosophy of Nature
e.       Aubenque seeks to demonstrate that Aristotle’s ontology is rooted in the experience of movement – change (p. 422-438)
                                                              i.      Becoming presupposes composition (p. 427)
                                                            ii.      Movement presupposes divisibility (p. 428)
                                                          iii.      “That which becomes” is said in 2 ways (p. 431)
                                                          iv.      3 principles of becoming (p. 432-438)
1.      Matter, form and privation (p. 432)
a.       Privation = non-being (p. 432-435)
2.      Time (p. 435-438)
                                                            v.      Distinction between Act and Potency (p. 438-443)
1.      Act (p. 440-442)
2.      Which is primary: Act or Potency? (p. 442-443)
                                                          vi.      Consideration of the Aporias of movement which give birth to the distinction between Act and Potency (p. 443-456)
1.      The first Aporia (p. 443-448)
a.       This aporia is not solved by Aristotle (p. 445-448)
2.      The second Aporia (p. 448-456)
a.       Again, Aristotle does not respond to this aporia, he simply reformulates it (p. 449-451)
b.      The Scholastic definition of movement (p. 453-454)
c.       Aubenque’s definition of Movement (p. 454) and Infinite (p. 454-455)
f.       There is, therefore, no science of being because being cannot be comprehended or apprehended (p. 456-457)
                                                              i.      Aristotle transforms, therefore, the question of being into the question of οὐσία – essence (p. 457)
1.      What is οὐσία? (p. 457-460)
a.       What is the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι? (p. 460-472)
                                                                                                                                      i.      2 interpretations (p. 461-466)
                                                                                                                                    ii.      The proper interpretation (p. 466-472)
                                                            ii.      Of what beings can there be definition? (p. 472-484)
1.      Of composed beings? (p. 473-484)
a.       There can be neither definition nor demonstration of composed being (p. 477-484)
g.      Conclusion: The impossibility of all discourse (p. 483-484)
                                                              i.      From where, then does human discourse come? (p. 484)


The third Part: Conclusion
1.      Aubenque notes that his conclusions appear to be quite negative (p. 487)
a.       The impossibility (at least on one level) of theology – a word on God (p. 487-488)
                                                              i.      This impossibility is not due to the nature of God, but to the impossibility that we have of thinking God.
                                                            ii.      This impossibility is the source of negative theology (p. 487-488)
b.      The absolute impossibility (on all levels – the ontological and the discourse concerning being) of ontology (p. 488-489)
                                                              i.      Aubenque asks if this claim is alien to Aristotle (p. 489-491)
1.      The temporality and contingency of humans keep us from possessing any science (p. 491-495)
a.       But, they do not prevent us from engaging in dialectic (p. 495)
b.      Ontology is necessarily, therefore, a dialectic (p. 495-499)
                                                                                                                                      i.      Dialectic = imitation (p. 497-498)
1.      Imitation is like art (p. 498-499)
2.      In this way, through ontological dialectic, man imitates (p. 499-505), and indeed becomes like (p. 503), God.
c.       A final description of the metaphysics of Aristotle (p. 505)
2.      Proof that the philosophy of Aristotle is Aporetic (p. 506-508)
a.       2 traditional responses to the incompleteness of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (p. 506-507) – for Aubenque, both of the traditional responses are faulty (p. 507).
                                                              i.      The Christian/Islamic response (p. 506)
                                                            ii.      The Neo-platonic response (p. 507)
b.      Aubenque’s conclusion and theory concerning the proper response (p. 507-508)
                                                              i.      There are two ways of considering an aporia (p. 507-508)
1.      Either solve it (p. 507)
2.      Or continue to appreciate it and perpetually re-propose it (p. 508)
                                                            ii.       Option 1 destroys the aporia, option 2 accomplishes it. (p. 508)
                                                          iii.      Aubenque claims to have proved that the aporias of Aristotle’s Metaphysics are unsolvable because there is no solution for them in a world of essences. “We believe that we have shown that the metaphysical aporias of Aristotle did not have a solution, in the sense that they were not solved somewhere in a universe of essences.” (p. 508)  - my translation
                                                          iv.      Aubenque proposes that it is because they are unsolvable that Aristotle says that they are always and ever the subject of our research. (p. 508)
                                                            v.      Therefore, states Aubenque, for Aristotle, to “never stop researching what being is, is to have already responded to the question: What is Being?” (p. 508) – my translation.
1.      Therefore, perpetually working to answer, but never answering, the question of being is, according to Aubenque, what it means, for Aristotle, to answer the question of being.

a.       This feels as if Aubenque is reading Heidegger into Aristotle!!!

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